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LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution gives Congress the power to control federal land.' Much
of this power has been delegated to federal agencies. The continual flow of
statutes and regulations that affect land and natural resources indicate the
import of this authority. This Survey examines two cases that pit private in-
terests against congressional and administrative power to control federal land.
Deference to the federal government's use of this power played a key role in
two Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal's opinions during the Survey term.
Part I explores the federal government's control of roads that cross public
land to access private land. In United States v. Jenks,2 an individual chal-
lenged Forest Service regulations that govern access to private inholdings.3
The Jenks court held that all owners of road accessible inholdings had to
comply with the permit scheme regardless of any private patent or common-
law access rights.4 This was a case of first impression for the Tenth Circuit
and ended the confusion created by the myriad of past and present federal
policies governing access rights.
Part II explores the Tenth Circuit's deference to federal administrative
control of public land. In Sierra Club v. Cargill,5 the Tenth Circuit upheld a
Forest Service determination that a change from an illegal seven-year regener-
ation standard for timber production to the congressionally mandated five-year
standard was not significant.6 The ruling allowed timber sale contracts to be
carried out notwithstanding that they were still premised on the seven year
standard. This case was the Tenth Circuit's first opportunity to interpret the
new regeneration standard.
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, states that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States .... The authority granted to Congress in the property clause to manage federally
held land is "without limitation." Kleppe v. New Mexico, 436 U.S. 529, 539 (1975). Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. similarly interpreted this power: "[t]he state has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. Georgia v. Tennes-
see Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
2. 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
3. An inholding is private land surrounded by public land. United States v. Jenks, 804 F.
Supp. 232, 234 (D.N.M. 1992), affd in part as modified, rev'd in part, 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir.
1994).
4. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518.
5. 11 F.3d 1545 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. Id. at 1550.
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I. LAND USE
A. Regulating Access to Privately Held Land over Public Land:
United States v. Jenks.7
1. Background
Current federal policy regarding public land focuses on land manage-
ment.' Prior to its current policy regarding public land, the federal govern-
ment had utilized overlapping stages of acquisition,9 disposal,'" and reten-
tion" of public land. The transition from the policy of disposal of land for
private use, to the policy of retaining land for public use, created problems re-
garding access rights to private inholdings. The history of public land poli-
cy,' 2 therefore, represents a "tangled array of laws granting right-of-ways
across federal land"'3 to inholdings.
a. Creation of Access Rights
Access to private land became an important issue when the federal gov-
ernment began to dispose of the public land. Federal land grants to private
individuals dramatically increased under the policy of disposal in the late
Nineteenth Century because the government sought to promote expansion into
the unsettled Western United States.'4 The Homestead Act of 1862 granted
160 acres to settlers who agreed to live on, and make improvements to, the
land for five years.'5 Access to land held by homesteaders was not explicitly
7. 22 F.3d 1513 (1Oth Cir. 1994).
8. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94
Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., 48 U.S.C.)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing management schemes and guidelines for Alaskan lands); Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C §§ 1701-1784 (1988) (establishing
guidelines for management of forest land); Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 528-531 (1988) (authorizing and directing the Secretary of Agriculture to balance and manage
economic and non-economic uses of public land); National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Congress has created various agencies to manage
federal lands including the Bureau of Land Management, the United States Forest Service, and the
National Parks Service.
9. Examples include the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas (Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo), the Oregon Territory, and the acquisition of all other lands that currently represent the
boundaries of the United States. James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public
Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 241, 247 (1994).
10. See, e.g., The Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (repealed 1976) (pro-
viding free land to settlers of the frontier).
11. Examples of lands reserved from the private domain for public use by Congress include
land reserved for National Parks, National Forests and National Wildlife Areas.
12. See Huffman, supra note 9, at 245-255 (providing a brief history of the stages of federal
land policy).
13. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1515.
14. See Huffman, supra note 9, at 247-50; see also The Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12
Stat. at 392.
15. Id. The acreage that could constitute a homestead was later enlarged by Congress. See
Desert Lands Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (1988)) (provid-
ing for homesteads larger than 160 acres on arid western lands); The Enlarged Homestead Act, ch.
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provided for in the Homestead Act of 1862; however, it was presumed that the
act granted "unimpeded access to their property." 6
Revised Statute 2477 (R.S. 2477) was enacted pursuant to disposal poli-
cy." This statute preserved rights of access across public land; "[t]he right-
of-way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for
public uses, is hereby granted."'"
In 1976 the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)9 re-
pealed R.S. 2477.20 Congress included a savings clause in FLPMA that pre-
served the right to assert an R.S. 2477 right-of-way claim, if the right existed
prior to the passage of FLPMA.2 R.S. 2477, therefore, still protects those
who have properly asserted the statute for access to their land. R.S. 2477 has
never been a grant of rights, but a statutory recognition of permissible en-
croachment upon public land.22 The existence of right-of-ways varies from
state to state because the right is dependent on the state law interpreting R.S.
2477.23
The elements necessary to establish an R.S. 2477 right-of-way are pecu-
liar in that the right remains dormant; roads may have been established that
satisfy the elements but may not be recognized as such until the right to use
them has been asserted.24 To establish a recognized right to a R.S. 2477 road,
the proponent of the right must establish that the road is for a public high-
way, that the land traversed by the road is in fact public land,26 that the
public land is not reserved for other uses, 7 and that the right existed prior to
298, 36 Stat. 531 (1910) (repealed 1976) (homesteads for dry farming could be 320 acres).
16. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1515 (citing Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890)).
17. Mining Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251. R.S. 2477 was originally section 8
of a law entitled "An Act Granting Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public
Lands, and for Other Purposes," commonly known as the Mining Act of 1866. The law was re-
codified in 1878 as Revised Statute 2477. In 1938, R.S. 2477 was recodified at 43 U.S.C. § 932.
This section was repealed in 1976 by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No.
94-579, Title VII, § 706(a), Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1784 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
18. Mining Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. at 253.
19. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
20. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. at 2793.
21. 43 U.S.C. § 1769(a) (1988).
22. See United States v. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. 232, 235 n.5 (D.N.M. 1992).
23. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1082-83 & n.13 (10th Cir. 1988), affd sub nom.,
Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1991).
24. Typically the right has been asserted as a defense to de facto trespass by miners and
settlers. See, e.g., Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 456 (1878); Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining
Co., 101 U.S. 274, 275 (1879). The right is also asserted in quiet title actions. See Jenks, 22 F.3d
at 1518.
25. See Luchetti v. Bandler, 777 P.2d 1326, 1327-28 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that a
road may be a highway even if it reaches only one home, but public use must be more than mere-
ly occasional), cert. denied, 777 P.2d 1325 (N.M. 1989); Brown v. Jolley, 387 P.2d 278, 281
(Colo. 1963) (holding that a road to a single home may be a public highway); United States v.
Rogge, 10 Alaska 130 (D. Alaska 1941) (finding that a toll road may be a public highway), aff d,
128 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 656 (1942).
26. See Haynes v. Virgin Islands, 392 F. Supp. 48, 50 (D.V.I. 1975) (holding that the lands
must be owned by the United States at the time the claimed public use began).
27. Designation of land for a national forest effectively reserves the federal land from the
assertion of subsequent public user right-of-way claims. See Adams v. United States, 3 F.3d 1254,
1995]
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the passage of FLPMA.2"
The transition from the policy of disposal of land for private use, to the
policy of retaining land for public use, generated questions regarding access
rights to inholdings. The transition was marked by an act in 1891 that autho-
rized the Executive Branch to withdraw land from the public domain for the
creation of national forest land." Six years later, Congress enacted the Forest
Service Organic Administration Act (the Organic Act) to create an agency to
manage this land.3" Section 478 of the Organic Act statutorily reaffirmed the
inholder's access rights over national forest land.3 Courts have construed this
section to apply to rights of access that existed prior to the reservation of such
land.32
b. Conditioning the Rights of Access
The retention of public lands by the federal government required that
management schemes be adopted for these lands. To understand the recent
changes in this area it is essential to review the history of the controlling
statutes and regulations. The Organic Act provided that rules and regulations
may be applied to an inholder's access roads.33 The policy of management
was also instrumental in the passage of the FLPMA, the act that repealed R.S.
2477 right-of-ways. FLPMA granted the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Secretary of the Interior the power to issue or renew right-of-ways. 34 The Act
also provided that right-of-ways could be subject to regulations proscribed by
the department that managed the land at issue.35
1258 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding right-of-ways to be dependent upon the land's status); see also
Bennet County v. United States, 394 F.2d 8, 13 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that land reserved for
Indian reservations pursuant to treaty are unavailable for R.S. 2477 claims). But see Wilderness
Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 882 n.90 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that reserved land can be made
amenable to an R.S. 2477 right-of-way by discretionary repeal or modification of reservation by
federal authorities), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
28. 43 U.S.C. § 1769(a); see also supra text accompanying note 22.
29. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (repealed 1976).
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 472-482, 551 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 478 provides in part:
Nothing ... [herein] ... shall be construed as prohibiting the egress or ingress of actual
settlers residing within the boundaries of national forests, or from crossing the same to
and from their property or homes; and such wagon roads or other improvements may be
constructed thereon as may be necessary to reach their homes and to utilize their proper-
ty under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture. Nor shall anything ... [herein] prohibit any person from entering upon such na-
tional forests for all proper and lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, locating
and developing the mineral resources thereof. Such persons must comply with the rule
and regulations covering such national forests.
Id.
32. See Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880, 888 (D.
Mont. 1980), affd in part, 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). This
right has not been construed as absolute. Id. at 889. Section 478 provides the United States Forest
Service with the discretion to deny access if the right does not exist otherwise. Id.; accord Jenks,
22 F.3d at 1515.
33. 16 U.S.C. § 478.
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
35. 43 U.S.C. § 1764(c) (1988).
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Congressional concern that the statutes had created vague rights of access
prompted further legislation. Congress passed section 1323 of the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) to eliminate any linger-
ing questions regarding access. 36 Section 1323(a) secures the right of access
to inholdings across land managed by the Department of Agriculture and re-
quires compliance with rules and regulations proscribed by the Secretary of
Agriculture.37 Although the Act was directed at Alaskan public land, section
1323(a) has been held to apply to all National Forest System land.38 Section
1323(b) of ANILCA similarly affirmed the same right of access over land
controlled by the Secretary of the Interior. ANILCA section 1323 clarified that
access to inholdings remained intact, tempered only by mandated compliance
with administrative rules and regulations.
In response to the management authority granted under the Organic Act,
FLPMA, and ANILCA, access road regulations were enacted.39 These regula-
tions require owners of inholdings to apply for a special use permit from the
Forest Service in order to continue using access roads.' The permits must as-
sure reasonable use and enjoyment of the inholdings.4" Established R.S. 2477
rights that provide access to inholdings are not subject to these regulations.42
ANILCA and the subsequent regulations seek to ensure landowner access to
private inholdings while retaining agency control over the public lands in order
to preserve and accommodate the land for other uses.
2. United States v. Jenk
43
In United States v. Jenks, the Tenth Circuit upheld the permit procedures
enacted by the Forest Service and found that they were not inconsistent with
asserted statutory, patent or common-law rights."
36. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371, 2488 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3210 (1988)).
37. Id. 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) provides:
[Tihe Secretary [of Agriculture] shall provide such access to nonfederally owned land
within the boundaries of the National Forest System as the Secretary deems adequate to
secure to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof: Provided, That such
owner comply with rules and regulations applicable to ingress and egress to or from the
National Forest System.
Id.
38. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States, 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). See also Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 91 Interior Dec. 165 (1984) (the
Interior Board of Land Appeals held that § 3210 ensures access across all land managed by the
BLM).
39. See Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1517-18.
40. 36 C.F.R. § 251.112(a) (1994).
41. 36 C.F.R. § 251.110(c) (1994).
42. Section 251.1 10(b) provides in part. "The regulations of this subpart do not affect rights-
of-ways established under authority of R.S. 2477." 36 C.F.R. § 251.110(b) (1994); see aso Jenks,
804 F. Supp. at 232 n.1L
43. 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
44. Id. at 1517-18.
1995]
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a. Facts
Jenks owned three ranches in Catron County, New Mexico,45 which are
completely surrounded by the Apache National Forest.' Three different roads
provided access to the ranches and pass through the Apache National For-
est.47 The Forest Service requested that Jenks apply for a special use permit
before he used any of the three access roads to his inholdings.' The pro-
posed permit included regulations governing use of the road to prevent harm
to the public land,49 and required a yearly fee of seventy-eight dollars be paid
in order to continue using the roads."0 Jenks refused to apply for the permit
and claimed that the permit scheme was inconsistent with his patent, common
law, and statutory rights."'
b. The District Court Opinion
The Forest Service brought suit in federal district court to compel Jenks to
apply for a permit in order to use each road. 2 Jenks filed a counterclaim pre-
mised on preexisting common law and statutory rights.53 Additionally, Jenks
brought a quiet title action to determine the status of his patent and common
law easement claims. 4
The parties agreed that Jenks had a right of access to his inholdings but
disputed the source of that right and whether the regulations were applica-
ble.55 The United States argued that Jenks did not have a R.S. 2477 right that
survived the passage of FLPMA because his roads were established after the
reservation of the forest, and therefore were subject to the permit scheme. 6
Jenks argued that the permit was not necessary because he had a common law
easement by necessity or an implied easement from the original grant of land
under the Homestead Act.
57
The district court found that the access roads were developed after the
1899 reservation of the Gila River Forest Reserve." This ruling barred the
finding of a R.S. 2477 right-of-way because the elements of that right were
not met.59 The court made no specific finding regarding whether the access
45. Id. at 1516. The land was granted to Jenks's predecessors in interest pursuant to the
Homestead Act. Id.
46. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 236. The Apache National Forest was created as part the Gila
River Forest Preserve in 1899. Id.
47. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1516.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1516-17.
50. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 234.




55. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 234-35.
56. Id. at 236; see also cases cited supra note 27 and accompanying text.
57. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 236.
58. Id.
59. See cases cited supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. Construction of the roads
began after the reservation of the forest land, thus the second element of a R.S. 2477 road was not
[Vol. 72:3
LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES
roads were in fact R.S. 2477 roads, and did not address Jenks's claim of an
established common-law easement. Instead, the court concluded that if such
easements existed, they were subject to regulation under FLPMA and
ANILCA.' The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the For-
est Service,6 and enjoined Jenks's further use of the roads until a special use
permit was applied for and granted.62
c. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the United States.63 The court agreed that Jenks had to file an
application.' This requirement was tempered by the court's finding that sum-
mary judgment was not proper since the district court failed to consider the
validity of Jenks's common law, statutory and patent claims that could have
alleviated the necessity of securing a permit for further use of the roads.65 In
light of these claims, which are now before the district court on remand, the
Tenth Circuit modified the injunction by making it effective only until Jenks
applied for the special use permit.' The court of appeals also reversed the
district court's finding that the terms and conditions of the permit were reason-
able.67
3. Analysis
ANILCA section 1323 insures an inholder's right of access, and requires
the land owner to comply with the applicable rules and regulations. 6 Con-
gress sought to balance the inholder's right of access to their land with the
federal interest in protecting the national forests.' The court found that the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture,7 ° were
consistent with the balance that ANILCA sought to achieve." Finding that
met. The New Mexico Courts stated that R.S. 2477 was enacted in order to promote the construc-
tion of public roads on unreserved public lands. See Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 235 (citing Lovelace v.
Hightower, 168 P.2d 864 (N.M. 1946)). However, this interpretation may not encompass a road
devoted to private access, rendering the first element unsatisfied as well.
60. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 237 (citing Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 496 F. Supp. at 889).
61. Id.
62. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1517.
63. This case was considered by Circuit Judges Barrett, Ebel and Baldock. The opinion was
written by Judge Baldock. No concurring or dissenting opinions were issued.
64. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518.
65. Id. at 1518-19.
66. Id. at 1519.
67. Id. at 1520. Because the permit was subject to negotiation and may not have been ap-
plied to Jenks, the Tenth Circuit believed that the proposed permit's terms were merely illustra-
tive; as such, commenting upon the terms would have been an improper advisory opinion. Id. The
court remanded that portion of the district court's opinion with instructions that it be vacated. Id.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (1988); see supra note 37.
69. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1517.
70. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
71. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518. The court relied on case law that addresses the proper degree of
deference to be afforded to an agency's interpretation of a statutory mandate. The court noted,
"[a]s long as an agency's procedures are reasonably designed to permit an agency to 'discharge
[itsl multitudinous duties,' a court should not interfere." Id. at 1518 (alteration in original) (quot-
19951
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the permit scheme was statutorily permissible allowed the court to address
whether the scheme infringed upon Jenks's asserted patent or common law
rights.72 The Tenth Circuit held that a scheme that required the filing of a
permit application was permissible regardless of the patent or common law
rights asserted by the landowner.73 The court reasoned that the federal gov-
ernment, as the dominant landowner, may exercise control over the land that a
servient easement holder uses.74
The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that an inholder must file a
permit application, and that the common law claims do not immunize the
landowner from this requirement. The Tenth Circuit found that the district
court had erred by not considering the validity of the asserted common law
claims." The court separated the regulatory scheme into two parts for this
analysis by distinguishing the requirement to file an application from the actu-
al permit approval process. According to the agency rules in question, an
inholder is required to file an application for a special use permit.76 However,
the court's holding that regardless of the claims asserted an application must
be filed, does not mean that all right-of-ways are subject to regulation. An
agency determination during the approval process may render the right-of-way
immune from regulation because a landowner may not need such a permit if it
ing Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 773 F.2d 1561, 1571 (11th Cit.
1985)). The Eleventh Circuit in Southern Motor Carriers relied on Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Vermont Yankee
provided two constraints on agency deference. The first constraint questions whether there exists a
constitutional bar to the rules promulgated. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543. The second con-
straint asks whether "extremely compelling circumstances" should preclude a court from deferring
to the rules promulgated by the agency. Id.
These constraints were not addressed by the district court nor by the Tenth Circuit in Jenks.
The Tenth Circuit noted that the rulemaking authority must arise from a statutory mandate. See
Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1517-18. This statement implicated the issue in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), which asked "whether Congress has
spoken directly to the precise question at issue." Congress enacted ANILCA section 1323(a),
which provides for rules and regulations to be adopted by the Secretary of Agriculture. 16 U.S.C.
§ 3210(a). But see Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the Forest Service was not entitled to deference for ignoring Endangered Species Act man-
dates and enjoining certain timber sales due to the presence of the Spotted Owl); Citizens for
Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp 970, 989-90, 996 (D. Colo. 1989) (finding no defer-
ence when statutes and regulations mandate procedures and requirements which are not followed
and enjoining an increase in the amount of timber to be sold because the Forest Service did not
look at alternatives and failed to delineate technology to be used to reach timber sale goals).
72. In addressing this issue, the Tenth Circuit adopted the logic of two Ninth Circuit rulings
which upheld the regulatory scheme against such common law claims. See Montana Wilderness
Ass'n, 496 F. Supp. at 889; Utah v. Adrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1009 (D. Utah 1979).
73. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518.
74. Id. The court cited the 1944 version of the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, section 484,
entitled "Change in Use of Dominant Tenement," which requires the contemplation of the normal
use, and development of that use, in determining whether an easement still exists when the use of
the easement changes. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 484 (1944). Land burdened with an ease-
ment is a servient tenement while the dominant estate is the land that the easement favors. See
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 323 (1980). The Federal Government, as the servient owner of
the easement appurtenant to Jenks's land, can prevent use of land not required by the normal
development of the dominant estate. Id.
75. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518.
76. 36 C.F.R. § 251.112(a) (1994).
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can be demonstrated that a common law right of access exists." This dis-
tinction is appropriate because prior to issuance of a special use permit, the
regulations require the agency to determine that the applicant has no existing
patent, state or common law access rights.78 On remand, the district court
must evaluate the validity of such claims because "they may affect the terms
of the permit or play a pivotal role in the decision to issue a permit."'79
The order of the district court enjoined Jenks's use of the access roads
until the special use permit was obtained." The Tenth Circuit modified the
order to enjoin use of the roads until Jenks filed a permit application." The
court relied upon the distinction drawn between the requirement to file such an
application and the permit approval process. If the agency concludes during
the approval process that the access roads are not subject to permit scheme, a
permit need not be issued. The court reasoned that an injunction, that is in
effect until a permit is obtained, is overbroad because it fails to take into
account the possibility that the roads may not be subject to regulation.82
The court recognized that an injunction that precludes the use of access
roads until the special use permit is approved may be proper in some circum-
stances.83 In discussing the district court's failure to address the validity of
the asserted common law claims, the Tenth Circuit noted that these claims
were properly before the court in a quiet title action.84 If these claims were
not raised in such a manner, the court presumably may enjoin use of the road
until the permit is obtained if no defense to the permit requirement has been
asserted.
The Tenth Circuit refused to address the validity of Jenks's claims be-
cause the government had not indicated that his access would be denied during
the approval process.85 If access would be denied during this time, Jenks can
assert these claims for interim relief, which may enjoin the denial of access.86
Jenks claimed that the permit terms were unreasonable because they im-
posed a fee for further use of the easement. Jenks objected to the conditional
nature of the easement permit, the Forest Service's ability to terminate the
easement, and the Service's discretion over all transfers of the easement.87
The United States argued for the first time in its brief that the permit at issue
was merely a proposed special use permit and was subject to negotiation.88
77. 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(f)(1) (1994).
78. Id. The regulations provide in part that the officer issuing the permit must ensure that
"[t]he land owner has demonstrated a lack of any existing rights or routes of access available by
deed or under State or common law." Id. Furthermore, R.S. 2477 roads are unaffected by the
regulations. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
79. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518.
80. Id. at 1519.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Cablevision of Tex. v. Oklahoma W. Tel., Co., 993 F.2d 208, 210 (10th Cir.
1993)).
84. Id. at 1518.
85. Id. at 1519 n.6.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1520 n.7.
88. The United States did not inform the district court that the permit was merely a proposal.
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The court refused to evaluate the reasonableness of the permit since there was
no indication that the permit at issue would be issued to Jenks. 9 The Tenth
Circuit remanded this issue to the district court with instructions to vacate the
portion of the opinion based on the proposed permit scheme.'
The Tenth Circuit also did not address Jenks's claim that the terms consti-
tuted a taking.9' This claim may be compelling on remand if the district court
finds that the roads are subject to regulation and if Jenks successfully demon-
strates that his roads emanate from a right granted under R.S. 2477. The fact
that such roads are immune from regulation,9" implies that they constitute
vested property rights and any infringement of these rights may represent a
taking under the Fifth Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit provided a much sharper focus on the procedural re-
quirements that a landowner must fulfill in order to comply with, and benefit
from, access regulations. The court drew the proper distinction between the
requirement to file, and the approval process, to give effect to the laws and
regulations governing access roads to inholdings. The Jenks court correctly
interpreted the regulations to allow for a land owner to assert that an access
road based on R.S. 2477 is immune from regulation, or to show that a com-
mon-law easement by necessity exists which may limit the terms of the per-
mit.93 This defense precludes or limits the agency's regulatory power over
certain access roads and can only be properly asserted during the permit ap-
proval process. The process of evaluating an inholder's potential claims can
only be reached upon requiring the landowner to file an application regardless
of the rights asserted.
II. NATURAL RESOURCES
A. Amending the Regeneration Standard of the Bighorn National Forest
Plan: Sierra Club v. Cargill94
1. Background
a. Provisions for Forest Resource Planning
In 1905, the United States Forest Service was granted the authority to
manage the national forests.95 Management of such lands necessitated ad-
vanced planning.96 Federal land planning initially focused only on timber har-
Id. at 1520.
89. Id. Courts established under Article Ill of the United States Constitution are limited to
resolving issues involving a case or controversy, and prohibited from providing advisory opinions.
This matter was not justiciable because the permit terms were not in their final form. Id.; see also
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968).
90. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1520.
91. See id.
92. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 42, 72 and accompanying text.
94. 11 F.3d 1545 (10th Cir. 1993).
95. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551 (1988).
96. See generally George C. Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning on the
Federal Lands, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 333-48 (1990) (discussing the history of forest planning
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vesting and grazing rights. Dramatic increases in the demands for timber and
recreational uses of forest land, however, strained the planning framework that
had developed.97 In 1960, Congress passed the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act (MUSYA). 9s The Act implicitly created the need for increased planning
to accommodate the various uses of forest land that the Act requires. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 99 requires an environmental im-
pact statement (EIS) for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment."'" Detailed planning became critical with
the passage of NEPA because failure to consider all implications and alterna-
tives of a project in the EIS operated as a bar to implementation of a desired
plan.'
°1
The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA) °2
was passed in 1974 to ensure that long range plans were implemented.' 3
The RPA planning requirements were incorporated into the National Forest
Management Act of 1976 (NFMA).' °4 Congress passed the NFMA to pro-
vide a management scheme for the national forests and to maintain the renew-
able resources on those lands. The NFMA provides the Forest Service with the
authority to adopt regulations necessary to implement the Act.' 5
and current timber planning schemes); Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and
Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REv. 1 (1984).
97. Coggins, supra note 96, at 334.
98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988). This Act directs the Secretary of Agriculture to consider
various potential uses of the land that will benefit the public in coordinating management plans.
16 U.S.C. §§ 530, 531 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). "Multiple use" in the forest context includes
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, fish and wildlife, and wilderness. 16 U.S.C. §
1604(e)(1) (1988).
99. 42 U.S.C §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1988).
101. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 162-63, 194-95 (1978) (enjoin-
ing the completion of a dam because the EIS failed to consider all the implications of the dam's
impact on the Snail Darter, an animal protected by the Endangered Species Act).
102. Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (1974) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C §§ 581(h),
1600-1610 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
103. Id. The Act requires a ten year assessment of the renewable resources in all the national
forests. 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Some of the considerations the assess-
ment addresses include the present and anticipated uses, and demands, of the resources. Id. Every
five years a program proposing long term planning objectives is to be prepared for all Forest
Service activities. 16 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The third planning requirement is
an annual evaluation of current Forest Service activities that are to be compared to the long term
planning objectives. 16 U.S.C. § 1606(c) (1988). Finally, a statement of policy is to be prepared
every five years which frames budget requests for the various programs. 16 U.S.C. § 1606(a)
(1988).
104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1982).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). The regulations must adhere to the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988). The regulations must also comply with NEPA by direct-
ing when the LRMP must include an EIS as required by 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The regulations
must also meet the goals of the planning program. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (1988). These goals in-
clude assurances that considerations of economic and environmental aspects and diversity of plant
life will be considered. Id. Continuing research on the effects of each plan to avoid impairment of
the land's productivity must also be insured by the regulations. Id.
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b. Developing a Forest Plan for Timber Production
Section 1604 of the NFMA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to devel-
op, maintain, and revise a land and resource management plan (LRMP or
plan) for each national forest." The LRMP must include planned timber
sales and the harvesting methods that will meet the timber sales goals. °7 The
planning procedure calls for cooperation between the regional forester, the
forest supervisor, and an interdisciplinary team which is responsible for the
preparation of the LRMP and the EIS."°8 The LRMP and the EIS are subject
to public scrutiny." An amendment to the plan may be made by the forest
supervisor after the final plan has been adopted."' An amendment does not
require the Forest Service to redesign the LRMP and the EIS if the change is
insignificant. " '
The process of forest planning, as governed by the regulations enacted by
the Forest Service, require compliance with the MUSYA and NEPA." 2 The
forest plan must consider many factors and alternatives to ensure compliance
with NEPA." 3 One factor is the ability to preserve the land in compliance
with the management guidelines." 4 The management guidelines generally
require the forest plan to protect all the resources to ensure their productivi-
ty."
5
Congressional timber harvest management guidelines seek to ensure con-
tinued productivity and availability of timber."6 Congress mandated that the
LRMPs and the regulations guarantee that timber will be harvested only if
"such lands can be adequately restocked within five years after harvest.""' ?
The regulations enacted by the Forest Service, under the authority of the
NFMA, provide a three stage process for identifying land suitable for timber
harvest in the LRMP." The first stage excludes land that is not physically
suitable for harvesting timber."9 Without assurances that the land can be re-
stocked within five years, it is considered physically unsuitable for timber
production. 2 ° Land that is not excluded in stage one must proceed through
106. 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(0.
108. See 36 C.F.R § 219.10 (a)(3) (1994).
109. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b).
110. 36C.F.R. §219.10(0.
111. Id. If the change is not significant the plan may be implemented after public comment
and compliance with NEPA procedures. Id. The determination of whether the amendment is sig-
nificant is typically made in the environmental assessment. See Sierra Club v. Cargill, 11 F.3d
1545, 1549 (10th Cir. 1993).
112. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.10, 219.12 (1994).
113. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.12 (detailing the regulatory scheme for considering and evaluating
various alternatives).
114. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27 (1994).
115. Id.
116. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(ii) (1988).
117. Id.
118. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14 (1994). See Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp.
970, 978-79 (D. Colo. 1989) (discussing and interpreting of the three stage suitability analysis as
part of the LRMP process).
119. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14.
120. Id. Land is unsuitable for timber production if "[tihere is not reasonable assurance that
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two stages of economic analysis.'
Stage two evaluation focuses on the costs and benefits of the particular
area under analysis.' This stage is designed to "provide information on the
financial attractiveness of the various proposed alternatives."'23 This econom-
ic analysis does not exclude or add land to timber production; the focus is on
generating raw data to be used in the third stage of the suitability analysis.
The third stage involves a broad economic analysis of the LRMP. This
stage evaluates land suitable for timber production with regards to cost effi-
ciency of including or excluding land from timber production.'24 This stage
considers the long term objectives of the LRMP for the entire forest, as well
as the returns and the costs of managing the existing timber inventory. 25 The
allowable sale quantity (ASQ) is used in the third stage of the timber suitabili-
ty analysis.'26 The ASQ, which is prepared by the interdisciplinary team and
is included in the LRMP, represents the ceiling for long term timber produc-
tion objectives in the forest plan.'27
The planning process for timber harvest in each national forest ends with
the completion of the LRMP, the accompanying EIS as required by NEPA,
such lands can be adequately restocked as provided in § 219.27(c)(3)." 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(3).
Section 219.27(c)(3) provides in part:
When trees are cut to achieve timber production objectives, the cuttings shall be made in
such a way as to assure that the technology and knowledge exists to adequately restock
the lands within 5 years after final harvest. Research and experience shall be the basis
for determining whether the harvest and regeneration practices planned can be expected
to result in adequate restocking. Adequate restocking means that the cut area will con-
tain the minimum number, size, distribution and species composition of regeneration as
specified in regional sivilcutural guides for each forest type.
36 C.F.R. § 219.27(c).
Other stage one factors may render the land unsuitable for timber harvest: land that is not
forest land (currently and historically having less than ten percent tree cover) is not suitable for
harvest, technology must exist to insure that timber production will not irreversibly damage soil
productivity or watershed conditions, and land withdrawn from timber production by Congress, the
Secretary of Agriculture or the Chief of the Forest Service, is also to be excluded at stage one. See
36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(1),(2),(4).
121. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 978.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. "Cost efficiency" is meant to include "concepts of cost effectiveness and economic
efficiency." Id. at 978 n.7. This term acknowledges that many important variables cannot be as-
signed a value. Numerical values are not easily ascertainable for measuring the other forest objec-
tives such as preserving recreation, watershed, range, fish and wildlife, and wilderness. Stage three
is therefore a flexible analysis that considers these indeterminable values and the objectives of the
overall forest plan. Id. see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(c).
125. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 978; see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(c).
126. The ASQ is "[tihe quantity of timber that may be sold from the area of suitable land
covered by the forest plan for a time period specified by the plan." 36 C.F.R. § 219.3 (1994).
Traditionally, timber quantities are represented in million board feet (MMBF).
127. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(c) provides the regulatory framework for the third stage of the land
suitability analysis. Section 219.14(c)(3) excludes land if "[tjhe lands are not cost-efficient, over
the planning horizon, in meeting forest objectives, which include timber production." Id. §
219.14(c)(3) (emphasis added). A long term objective that includes timber production is represent-
ed by the timber production limit, the ASQ. The Citizens for Environmental Quality court found
that the ASQ is a relevant consideration for the third stage of the analysis, even though that figure
is predetermined. 731 F. Supp. at 988.
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and the record of decision. 2 The regional forester selects and approves the
appropriate management plan in the record of decision from the alternatives
presented.'29 Upon approval, the plan and the EIS are subject to administra-
tive appeal. 3
2. Sierra Club v. Cargill
131
In Sierra Club v. Cargill the Tenth Circuit deferred to the Forest Service's
determination that an amendment to the Bighorn LRMP that corrected an
improper seven year forest regeneration standard to a five year standard, was
not significant. 32 The court held that this determination was neither arbitrary
and capricious, nor an abuse of discretion.'33
a. Facts
This dispute involved the Bighorn National Forest ,(the Bighorn) which is
located in north-central Wyoming, and is part of the Big Horn Mountain
Range. The Bighorn is comprised of 1,115,172 acres of land.'34 The forest
lies between 4,000 and 13,175 feet of elevation. 33 Average precipitation in
this arid region is below twenty-five inches per year; only five to six inches of
the precipitation falls during the summer growing season. 36 Tree growth is
slow under these conditions and much of the forest is barren.
37
The Forest Service developed the first Bighorn Forest LRMP in 1985.38
This plan allotted 14.9 million board feet (MMBF) of timber to be harvested
annually for ten years. 39 The 14.9 MMBF figure represents the ASQ for the
Bighorn plan. The ASQ was based upon a seven year regeneration stan-
dard."4 This regeneration standard conflicted with the NFMA and Forest
Service regulations, which called for a five year standard, 4' and led the Sier-
ra Club to administratively appeal the LRMP. 42 The appeal was denied by
the Forest Service and the Sierra Club brought the matter before the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming seeking injunctive and de-
128. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(c).
129. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(i) & (j); see also Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at
978.
130. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(d). As of 1989, sixty-two of the forest plans had been adminis-
tratively appealed. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 976. The Citizens for Environmen-
tal Quality court noted that their opinion was one of the first to provide judicial review of forest
service decisions regarding forest plans. id.
131. Sierra Club v. Cargill, II F.3d 1545 (10th Cir. 1993).
132. Id. at 1550.
133. Id.
134. Sierra Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 (D. Colo. 1990).
135. Appellee's Brief at 4, Sierra Club v. Cargill (Nos. 92-1277 & 92-1316) (citing FINAL
ENVIRONMENT IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE BIGHORN NATIONAL FOREST LAND AND RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT PLAN, October 1985 at II-1 to II-2).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id.
140. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1547.
141. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
142. Sierra Club, 731 F. Supp. at 1095.
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claratory relief.'43 Wyoming Sawmills, an employer in Sheridan County, and
the Sheridan County Economic Development Council intervened to protect
vested timber contract rights.'T
b. The District Court Opinion
The Sierra Club filed the action in federal court in July 1989. The Forest
Service issued directives to replace the seven year restocking standard with the
five year standard in December of the same year.'45 The directives affected
the planning and project stage of the LRMP.' Under the first directive, the
plan would have assured that the lands were capable of being adequately re-
stocked within five years.'47 The second directive required a finding, at the
project level, that all land would meet the five year standard prior to all timber
sales. " The Forest Service admitted that the Bighom LRVP would have to
be revised to include a recalculated ASQ value based on the five year stan-
dard. 49 This revision of the plan was scheduled to occur in 1989.5 The
Forest Service claimed that the directives would correct the forest planning
calculations that were premised on the improper seven year standard and
moved to dismiss the action as moot."S' The district court held that the suit
was justiciable since the violation could occur again, concluded that the effects
of the seven year standard had not been adequately removed,'52 and enjoined
certain logging pursuant to the plan.
The district court held that the first directive, which was meant to ensure
compliance with the NFMA and the regulations at the planning stage, was
ineffective.' The Forest Service argued that the five year standard requires
only that technology exists to comply with the standard.'54 The court inter-
preted the five year standard to require identification and implementation of
143. Id. at 1098.
144. See id. at 1096-97. Intervention was limited to participation in the discovery process and
submission of briefs on the issues presented by the formal parties. Id.
145. Id. at 1098.





151. Id. at 1098.
152. Id. The district court applied the County of Los Angeles v. Davis test for determining
when an action is moot should a party voluntarily cease the alleged illegal conduct. County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979). This test has two prongs that the movant must satisfy
to render a case moot: 1) that the violation will not recur and, 2) "interim relief or events have
completely" removed the effects of the alleged violation. Id. The district court found that the
Forest Service had abandoned the seven year standard for this plan but "ha[d] not repudiated the
legality of the longer standard." Sierra Club, 732 F. Supp. at 1098. The court found that the first
prong had not been met since there was no guarantee that the standard, which the Forest Service
maintained did not violate federal law, would not be used in the future. Id. at 1098-99. The Forest
Service did not satisfy the second prong either because the effects of the violation have not been
entirely removed. The court found that the LRMP had not yet been fully amended by the direc-
tives. Id. The court also noted that the directive was contradictory; it assured that the five year
standard would be met, however the ASQ continued to be based upon the seven year standard. Id.
153. Sierra Club, 732 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
154. Id. at 1100.
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the technology in the LRMP to insure that the standard is met.'55 The inter-
venors contended that because the five year standard requires that the land
can,"' instead of will, be restocked, the regulation is not absolute.'57 The
court dismissed this argument, stating that "[tiechnological feasibility" is a
standard that would render the regulation meaningless since "[h]ypothetically,
the technology exists to restock an area the size of the whole Bighorn National
Forest (or the entire State of Wyoming) within five years. The Forest Service
could potentially adopt a restocking standard of any length while the technolo-
gy exists to restock within five years."' 58 The district court rejected this hy-
pothetical, potential regeneration analysis in favor of maintaining the integrity
of the congressional mandate.'59
The district court also held that the directives and the LRMP failed to
meet the legal guidelines at the project level."6' The second directive re-
quired a finding for every timber sale that the five year standard was to be
met. The court found the directive to be meaningless because there was no
criteria included in the directive that could serve as a basis for such a find-
ing. '6 This case-by-case analysis was judged to be an inadequate method to
assure that the proper standard was met absent a formal redetermination of the
land's suitability for timber production pursuant to the NFMA.'62
The district court enjoined any timber harvesting emanating from future
contracts based on the seven year standard.'63 The court ordered the Forest
Service to revise the LRMP to comply with the five year standard within the
three stage suitability analysis required by the regulations before it could offer
more land for timber sales." 4 The court refused to retroactively apply the
injunction to contracts that had been approved prior to the directives."' Al-
though the contracts were based upon the impermissible seven year standard,
the court found that an injunction would "unreasonably disrupt milling opera-
155. Id. The court based this finding on an interpretation of a similar regulation in Citizens
for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989), where the court analyzed
36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(2), which removes land from timber production if "[tiechnology is not
available to ensure timber production from the land without irreversible resource damage to soils
productivity or watershed conditions." Sierra Club, 732 F. Supp. at 1100. In Citizens for Environ-
mental Quality, the court interpreted this regulation to require that the technology be identified and
implemented into the LRMP when timber production is "contemplated on potentially unsuitable
lands." Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 985. The two regulations, the five year stan-
dard and the soil/watershed protection requirement, are similar in that they both demand that tech-
nology be available to ensure that the regulation is met. The court noted that compliance with the
five year standard is to be determined based on "research and experience." Sierra Club, 723 F.
Supp. at 1100 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(c)(3) (1994)). This regulatory language supported the
court's position that the LRMP shall identify and implement technology that assures compliance
with the regulations.
156. See supra note 120.
157. Sierra Club, 732 F. Supp. at 1100.
158. Id.




163. See id. at 1101-02.
164. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
165. Sierra Club, 732 F. Supp. at 1102.
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tions in Sheridan County."'" This finding was premised on the Forest
Service's assurance that continued monitoring of those sales would guarantee
that the five year regeneration standard would be met. 67
The Forest Service then amended the Bighorn LRMP to comply with the
district court order. Use of the five year regeneration standard rendered 74,022
acres of land physically unsuitable for timber production under stage one
analysis."6 The Forest Service, however, reincorporated 69,645 acres of this
land into the amended plan as suitable for timber production based upon the
second and third stages of the analysis.69 The amended plan therefore re-
moved only 4,377 acres from the original LRMP."7 ° The Forest Service con-
tended that this was permissible because stage one only identifies land that is
tentatively unsuitable, whereas the third stage allows the inclusion of such land
to meet the overall objectives of the timber production goals, the ASQ. 7'
This revision of the LRMP was deemed not to be significant by the Forest
Service based on the results of the three stage analysis.'
The Forest Service did not include a recalculated ASQ figure in the
amended LRMP and adhered to the production goals established under the
seven year standard.'73 However, the Forest Service did begin a reformula-
tion of the ASQ independent of the revision of the LR!MIP.' 74 The Forest Ser-
vice recognized that the recalculation may result in an amendment that is
significant to the Bighorn LRMP. 75 The forest supervisor approved the
amended plan and the Forest Service denied the Sierra Club's administrative
appeal of the decision.
Based upon the revised LRMP, which incorporated the five year standard,
the Forest Service moved to dissolve the injunction.' 6 The district court de-
nied the motion,' reasoning that no alternatives had been considered, the
three stage analysis was not adequately adhered to, and the ASQ for the plan
represented unrealistic production goals.' 8 The Forest Service appealed the




168. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1549.
169. See id. The court noted that after stages two and three of the analysis were conducted the
decrease amounted to only 4,377 acres.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 1548-49; see also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
172. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1549.
173. Id. at 1549.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1547.
177. Id. (citing Order Regarding Motion for Dissolution of Injunction (D. Colo. Aug 13,
1992)).
178. Id. (citing Clarification of Order Regarding Motion for Dissolution of Injunction at 1-2
(D. Colo. October 23, 1992)).
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c. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision not to dissolve the
injunction.'79 The Tenth Circuit stated the three stage multiple-use analysis is
to be undertaken only upon the initial development of the LRMP or when an
amendment to the plan is deemed significant. 8 ' The court held that the For-
est Service's determination that the amendment to the plan was not significant
was neither arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.'' The Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court, finding the district court had abused its
discretion by applying an improper standard of review that led to the applica-
tion of the wrong analytical framework to resolve the issues.'82
The dissenting opinion noted that the injunction itself had not been ap-
pealed and was therefore not subject to judicial review. 3 The dissent framed
the issue as whether the district court had abused its discretion by finding that
the Forest Service had not properly complied with the injunction.'84
3. Analysis
The majority framed the issue as whether the Forest Service's actions in
response to the injunction complied with the regulations, and whether the
district court's refusal to dissolve the injunction constituted reversible er-
ror.' The court focused on whether the Forest Service correctly determined
that the LRMP amendment, which changed the regeneration standard from
seven to five years, was not significant.8 6 If the Forest Service had deemed
the amendment to be significant, the regulations require the Service to "follow
the same procedure as ... that required for development and approval of a
forest plan."'8 7 This would mean that the LRMP process, the preparation of
the EIS and the calculation of the ASQ would have to begin anew. The stan-
dard of review to be applied to this determination is whether the agency action
was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law. 8
The threshold issue, the significance of the amendment, did escape ex-
press review before the district court.8 9 However, because the district court's
order included instructions to completely revise the LRMP in accordance with
the three stage suitability analysis, the amending of the regeneration period
179. Id. at 1545 (Tacha, J., writing for the majority was joined by Barrett, J.).
180. Id. at 1548.
181. Id. at 1550.
182. Id. at 1548.
183. Id. at 1550 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1548.
186. Id.
187. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(f).
188. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1548; see also Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(a), 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1988). The court stated that the deferential standard of review is important
because the agency's determination of such an amendment is "extremely fact bound." Sierra Club,
11 F.3d at 1548 (citing Securities Exch. Comm'n v. Blinder, Robinson, & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 679
(10th Cir. 1988)).
189. See Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1548.
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may have been impliedly deemed significant by the district court.
The Forest Service determined that the change in the restocking standards
was not significant in its environmental assessment that reconsidered the Big-
horn plan."9° The finding of insignificance by the Forest Service was pre-
mised on the conclusion that only 4,377 acres were affected, 9' and that the
land unaffected was the same in character and location as the land originally
incorporated into the allowable sale quantity.'92 The Tenth Circuit upheld the
agency's determination that the amendment was not significant even though
the ASQ was determined based upon the seven year standard.
9 3
The Sierra Club argued that the Forest Service improperly amended the
LRMIP because the ASQ was not recalculated.'94 The ASQ, an important
long term objective in the three stage suitability analysis'95 for the Bighom
plan, remained at 14.9 MMBF per year. The Forest Service admitted that the
ASQ had proven to be unrealistic and had begun a recalculation of the number
which may result in a significant amendment to the Bighorn LRMP.' The
court disagreed with the Sierra Club's argument that the failure to recalculate
the ASQ was an error.'97 That a significant change was on the horizon did
not require the Forest Service to "to cease all 'non-significant' adjustments in
the Bighorn plan, such as an otherwise 'non-significant' change in the regener-
ation standard."'98
Sierra Club's position that the implementation of the correct regeneration
standard affected the plan significantly"9 is not without merit. Applying the
five year standard to the first stage of the suitability analysis removed 74,022
acres from timber production as physically unsuitable for timber harvest. The
forest Service recouped this acreage through the two stages of economic anal-
ysis. Congress, however, mandated a five year regeneration standard and made
no mention of deviating from the standard through economic analysis.2 " To
effectively apply the correct regeneration standard, the Forest Service should
have revised the ASQ since this figure was based upon the seven-year stan-
dard and had a direct effect on timber sale calculations."' Instead the court
190. Id. An environmental assessment is a document that is prepared to decide whether an
environmental impact statement (EIS) is necessary under NEPA, or alternatively, whether to pre-
pare a finding of no significant impact which precludes the preparation of an EIS. 40 C.F.R. §
1508.9(a)(2) (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
191. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1549.
192. Id. The Forest Service Handbook 1909.12, ch. 5.31, presents several factors for deter-
mining whether an amendment is significant: "1) timing; 2) location and size of area involved; 3)
the degree to which goals, objectives and outputs are affected; and 4) whether management pre-
scriptions are modified." Id.
193. Id. at 1548-49.
194. Id. at 1549.
195. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.




200. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
201. See Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1551. Applying the long term goals to the stage three analy-
sis reincorporated most of the timber excluded under stage one, resulting in only 4,377 acres being
removed from timber production. Id.
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separated these seemingly intertwined components, by characterizing the revi-
sion of the ASQ as "a significant change ... on the horizon" that need not be
addressed for a finding of insignificance.2' 2 The regulations, however, appear
to conflict with this decision: land is to be considered not suitable for timber
production and suitable for the alternatives if "[t]he lands are not cost-effi-
cient, over the planning horizon, in meeting forest objectives, which include
timber production. 2 °3 The contention that the ASQ required revision with
the correct standard is viable assuming that cost efficiency includes adherence
to the mandated, shorter regeneration standard since that ensures quicker re-
growth and greater forest productivity.
The Forest Service used updated information for their reanalysis of the
land suitable for timber production. This additional data was gathered from a
new computer data base,20 4 more precise mapping capabilities, and additional
regeneration criteria.0 5 The Sierra Club argued that the Forest Service should
have used this data to recalculate the ASQ so as to change the long term ob-
jectives.'2° The Tenth Circuit held that the regulations do not require a read-
justment of a LRMP whenever new data is available and held that a failure to
do so is permissible.2"7
The dissent illuminated the Forest Service's sleight of hand that disguised
the change as insignificant. The majority held that since the amendment is not
significant, a full reanalysis of the ASQ was not necessary at that time. Al-
though the regulations do not require the Forest Service to revise the ASQ, the
dissent pointed out that the only reason that the change was insignificant was
because the ASQ had not been recalculated with new data as had been done
for the suitability analysis." If this figure had been recalculated with the
new data, the long term objective would have been presumably much lower,
and the amount of land excluded under the three stage analysis would have
been much greater. This would have resulted in a significant amendment to the
Bighorn LRMP. The dissent reprimanded the Forest Service for what it
viewed as the selective application of new data to portions of the reanalysis
which allowed the agency to avoid a significant change in the LRMP: "[tihis
was done in the face of the district court's injunction requiring the Forest
Service to revise the plan and to use its 'research and experience' in determin-
ing whether the land is suitable for timber production."'"
The dissent also focused on the fact that the injunction itself was express-
202. Id. at 1549.
203. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(c)(3); see also supra note 120.
204. The Forest Service relies heavily upon information contained in computer data bases and
programs for the planning process. The programs used, FORPLAN I & II, are forced to choose
one management scheme amongst the alternatives. The chosen scheme represents the greatest net
benefit for the public. See generally Coggins, supra note 96, at 342-44 (discussing the FORPLAN
programs used in the planning process).
205. Sierra Club, II F.3d at 1459.
206. Id.
207. Id. The majority interpreted the regulations as implicitly allowing new data to be incor-
porated into non-significant management decisions. Id.; see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(f).
208. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1552-53.
209. Id. at 1553 (citation omitted).
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ly raised on appeal.2 ' From this position, the only issue to be addressed was
whether the Forest Service complied with the injunction."' The district court
"was concerned about the plan as a whole and the Forest Service's blatant
refusal to follow the statutory mandate regarding regeneration.""2 2 The dis-
sent, therefore, believed that the Forest Service could only be judged to have
not complied with the district court order because the agency did not incorpo-
rate the correct regeneration standard into every aspect of the plan as a whole,
which included the ASQ.213
The majority separated the three stage suitability analysis from the LRMP
by holding that significant changes on the horizon in the LRMP's long term
objective did not affect the three stage suitability analysis.2 4 This holding
does not recognize that the two are intertwined as the suitability analysis is
dependent on the long term objective represented by the ASQ.2 5 The majori-
ty reached this apparently disjunctive result by granting great deference to the
Forest Service's determination that the amendment was not significant.2"'
The district court opinion, and the subsequent order denying the motion to
dissolve the injunction, did analyze the effects of the amendment. Both found
that the implementation of the proper regeneration standard was required for
the whole of the Bighorn LRMvP which included the ASQ.2 7
The majority opinion arguably deferred too much to the finding of signifi-
cance by ending the analysis without acknowledging the significant effects of
such a determination. The court's refusal to acknowledge such effects could be
explained by the deference extended to fact bound agency decisions.2 8 The
Sierra Club court could have used this case as a means to clarify the
regulation's procedural requirement regarding the finding of significance. Had
the Tenth Circuit not simply deferred to that finding, but instead evaluated the
effect of such a finding, the court could have demonstrated the strict degree of
compliance with congressional mandates and agency regulations to which
agencies must adhere.
The court's decision may also be explained as an expansion of the discre-
tion given to the Forest Service in the area of timber production. The Tenth
Circuit stated that a contrary ruling would "improperly tie the hands of the
Forest Service and thereby thwart the purpose of the regulations."2 9 The reg-
ulations and the statutes were meant to allow for timber production while pre-
serving the forest for future productivity. The five year standard and the multi-
ple use doctrine address this concern. The effect of the deference afforded to
210. Id. at 1550.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1552.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1549.
215. See supra note 120.
216. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1548-49 (citing Wilderness Soc'y v. Tyrrel, 918 F.2d 813, 818
(9th Cir. 1990)).
217. Id. at 1102-03. The district court ordered the Forest Service to implement the "five year
regeneration standard in all aspects relating to harvest of lodgepole pine." Id. (emphasis added).
218. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1548.
219. Sierra Club, I1 F.3d at 1549.
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the agency is the continued impact of the harmful seven year regeneration
standard that is repugnant to the congressionally mandated five year standard.
CONCLUSION
The decisions in United States v. Jenks and Sierra Club v. Cargill were
both based upon an examination of procedural requirements. The episodic
nature of these decisions reveals that the court may not always view land and
natural resource cases in their entirety. This may indicate the court's willing-
ness to allow agencies considerable discretion because much of the land that
provides the nation's natural resources is located in the Tenth Circuit's geo-
graphic jurisdiction. More likely however, the court's deference is the result of
an unwillingness to reevaluate an agency's decision when applying complex
scientific data to a complex regulatory scheme. The Jenks court was presented
with a fairly simple task of evaluating the straight-forward procedural require-
ments. The Sierra Club court, on the other hand, was faced with a complex
regulatory scheme and detailed scientific considerations. In that situation,
deference to the agency's determination precluded an examination of the ef-
fects of the finding of non-significance, which could have shown the court that
agency's decision was incorrect. Ironically, the Jenks court cited one of its
own cases for the proposition that the Forest Service is required to follow its
own regulations.220 Apparently, the court did not follow this case in Sierra
Club because the regulations presumably would require a result contrary to
that reached by the court. Reliance on agency discretion and an evaluation of
legal procedure in these matters is not a departure from the court's jurispru-
dence; it simply reaffirms the Tenth Circuit's posture in deciding such cases.
Brian Widmann
220. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518 (citing Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 738 (10th Cir.
1993)).
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